MILLER v. JOHNSON
115 S.Ct. 2475 (1995) by unknown
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice
Volume 2 | Issue 1 Article 13
Spring 4-1-1996
MILLER v. JOHNSON 115 S.Ct. 2475 (1995)
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice at Washington & Lee
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice by an
authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
MILLER v. JOHNSON 115 S.Ct. 2475 (1995), 2 Race & Ethnic Anc. L. Dig. 97 (1996).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj/vol2/iss1/13
MILLER v. JOHNSON
115 S.Ct. 2475 (1995)
FACTS
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (the Act) designated
Georgia a covered jurisdiction under section 4 (b) of
the Act' because of past racially discriminatory actions
such as the imposition and maintenance of tests and de-
vices that limited voting rights.2 Under section 5 of the
Act, Georgia must obtain "preclearance review" from the
Attorney General or approval of a three judge panel of
the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia for any change in voting standards, practices, or
procedures? Review is intended to ensure that racial mi-
norities do not suffer setbacks in the effective exercise of
their voting rights.4 Congressional redistricting plans are
also subject to review.'
Georgia became entitled to another representative
as a result of the 1990 census, bringing its total to eleven
representatives.6 The Georgia General Assembly submit-
ted a congressional redistricting plan to the Department
of Justice (DOJ) for preclearance review.7 The plan had
two majority-minority8 districts and a third in which Af-
rican-Americans composed 35.37% of the voting age
population.9 The DOJ rejected the plan, noting that it
limited African-American voting potential to two ma-
jority-minority districts.'0 Georgia had one majority-
minority congressional district prior to 1990.11 The DOJ
had made an American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
created "max-black"l ' 2 plan their "guiding light" for ap-
proval of Georgia redistricting plans.
13
' Miller v. Johnson, 115 S.Ct. 2475,2483 (1995), citations
by Justice Kennedy omitted.
2 ee42 U.S.C. § 1971(a) and § 1973a and § 1973b.
3 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988) the State of Georgia has
the option of submitting a redistricting plan to the Attorney
General or filing for judgment by the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia to gain approval of a redistricting
plan. When a plan is submitted to the Attorney General the
Attorney General can either approve, or reject the plan. If no
response is made in 60 days the plan is to be considered ap-
proved. An action can be brought in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia for declaratory judgment in lieu
of, or alternate to, submission and approval of a congressional
redistricting plan by the Department of Justice. Pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1973c and 28 U.S.C. § 2284, a three judge panel
must hear challenges to congressional redistricting plans in areas
covered by the Act.
4 28 U.S.C. § 2284, and Beer v. United States, 425 U.S.
130, 141 (1976).
s42 U.S.C. § 1973c, and Beer, 425 U.S. at 133.
6 Johnson v. Miller 864 F.Supp. 1354, 1360 (S.D. Ga.
1994).
7Submitted October 1, 1991; SeeJohnson v. Miller, 1363.
After the DOJ's action, the Georgia General As-
sembly submitted a second plan.' 4 The second plan had
two majority-minority districts and a third district in
which African-Americans were 45.01% of the voting age
population. Is The DOJ rejected this plan, noting that a
three county area that was not included in any majority-
minority district had the second largest concentration
of African-Americans in Georgia.'
6
The General Assembly then submitted a third plan
that had three majority-minority congressional districts:
the Second, Fifth, and Eleventh districts. 17 The African-
American voting age populations of the districts were
52.33%, 57.47%, 60.36% respectively. 8 This plan re-
ceived DOJ approval.' 9
African-Americans were elected to represent
Georgia's Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Congressional Dis-
tricts.20 Five white residents of Georgia's Eleventh Con-
gressional District filed suit challenging the district on
January 13, 1994.21
A three judge district court panel decided that the
Eleventh District was invalid under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause as interpreted in Shaw." The district court
relied upon evidence of communication between the
ACLU, the DOJ, and the State of Georgia to establish
that the overriding purpose of the State in drawing the
Eleventh District was to satisfy DOJ demands.7 DOJ
demands were found to have been based on the max-
black plan created and promoted by the ACLU.24
8 "Majority-minority," means that more than 50% of the
voting age population in such a district was African-Ameri-
can.
9 Johnson v. Miller, at 1363, n. 5.
10 Letter dated January 21, 1992; See Id. at 1363.
" 115 S.Ct 2475, 2483.
12 "Max-black" refers to a plan devised in large part by Ms.
Kathleen Wilde, an attorney with the ACLU, that created a
congressional redistricting plan with three majority-minority
districts. The plan was supposedly designed to maximize Afri-
can-American voting power. See generally 864 ESupp. 1354,
1362-69.
'3 1d. at 1363 - 64.
'4 Submitted March 3, 1992; See Id. at 1364.
Id. at 1364.
16 Letter dated March 20, 1992; counties mentioned,
Screven, Effingham, and Chatham; Id. at 1364-1365.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 1366 - 68.
19 Approved April 2, 1992; See Id. at 1367.
20 Id. at 1369.
21 Miller, 115 S.Ct. at 2485.
22 1d.
" Johnson, 864 ESupp. 1354 at 1360 - 63.
24 1d. at 1360 - 61, and 1368.
The district court decided that the plaintiffs had
suffered no individual harm, and that the redistricting
had no adverse impact upon them.2s The district court
held that "[the] harms are systemic ones, rooted in so-
cial perception of state-sanctioned racial classifications."26
The district court concluded that strict scrutiny was
the applicable standard of review for the redistricting
plan because race was the substantial or motivating con-
sideration in creating the district.27,"Substantial or moti-
vating consideration" as defined by the district court
meant, (a) "consciously influenced by race, and (b) while
other redistricting considerations may also have con-
sciously influenced the district's shape, race was the over-
riding, predominant force determining the lines of the
district."2 The district court also indicated that "moti-
vating" meant that "race was the most prominent ele-
ment driving the legislature's planning," rather than one
of equal force with others.29
Direct and indirect evidence of racial motivation
found by the district court subjected the Eleventh Dis-
trict to strict scrutiny.30 Indirect evidence of racial moti-
vation based on the shape and segregationist' character
of the district's boundary subjected the district to strict
scrutiny.32 Direct evidence of racial motivation found
by the district court also subjected the Eleventh District
to strict scrutiny.
33
The district court considered compliance with the
Voting Rights Act, if constitutionally interpreted, to be
a compelling state interest.3 4 The specific application of
the Act, however, was held to be incorrect and uncon-
stitutional in this case .35The district court enjoined Geor-
gia from holding congressional elections in the challenged
district and the State appealed.36 The Supreme Court
granted a stay of the district court's order,37 and noted
probable jurisdiction.
38
2s Id. at 1370.26 Id.
27 Id. at 1372.
28Id.
29d. atfrn. 19.
30Johnson, at 1374 - 78.
31 "Segregationist" meaning district lines that appear to
have as their goal segregation of voters of different races. The
court did not use this term, but rather it is intended as a short-
ened expression of the recitation of the geo-demographic ac-
robatics that were referred to at length in the district court
opinion.
32 Johnson, 864 F.Supp. 1354 at 1374 - 77. Indirect evi-
dence is drawing an inference as to the intent of the legislature
via circumstantial evidence.
33 Id. at 1377 - 78. Direct evidence can indude recorded
statements or letters that make racial intent dear.
3 Id. at 1381 - 83, if the Act was properly interpreted,
compliance would be a compelling state interest because fail-
ure to comply would mean that ultimately a district court panel
would draw the districting map for the state. Compliance with
the Act if interpreted improperly could not be a compelling
interest because the actions related to such a improperly con-
HOLDING
In a five to four decision, the Court held that the
creation of Georgia's Eleventh Congressional District
gave rise to an equal protection claim because the redis-
tricting plan had race as "the predominant, overriding
factor.. . .,39 The Court also held that the redistricting
plan was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest.40 The Court affirmed the deci-
sion of the district court and remanded the case for pro-
ceedings consistent with the opinion.
41
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION
An analysis of Miller v. Johnson must begin with a
brief discussion of Shaw v. Reno.42 Shaw held that bi-
zarre congressional voting districts whose shape could
not be explained by reasons other than race are subject
to strict scrutiny analysis. Shaw established that such
districts were vulnerable to challenge.43 What remained
to be determined was whether a congressional district
that did not have such irregular bounds, but was drawn
to establish a majority-minority district, would be vul-
nerable to challenge. The question is answered affirma-
tively by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v.
Johnson.
The Court defined the issue of Miller as "whether
Georgia's new Eleventh District gives rise to a valid equal
protection claim under the principles announced in
Shaw, and, if so, whether it can be sustained nonetheless
as narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
interest."44 The Court explained that equal protection
principles apply to congressional redistricting 5 and re-
stated the holding in Shaw: "[W]e held that a plaintiff
states a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by al-
strued interpretation would be unnecessary.
351 Id. at 1384 -93, where the district court indicates that
section 5 of the Act mandates non-retrogression of the posi-
tion of minorities to the effective exercise of the elective fran-
chise (no back sliding in the free exercise and power of minor-
ity voting) and that the first two plans submitted met the non-
retrogression principle, and that the third plan was not "rea-
sonably necessary to comply with the Act." See Id. at 1385.
36 Id. at 1393.
37 Miller, 115 S.Ct. 36 (1994).
3' Miller, 115 S.Ct. 713 (1995), See 28 U.S.C. § 1253,
appeal from a three judge district court panel lies directly to
the Supreme Court.
39 Miller, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 2490.
40 Id. at 2490 - 93.
41 Id. at 2494.
42 Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct at 2816 (1993).
43 Id. at 2827, citing Karcher v. Daggett, (J.) Stevens, con-
curring.
44 Miller, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 2482.
41 Id. The Court cited a progression of equal protection
principles and a source or sources for each. See, e.g., U.S. Const.,
Amend. 14, § 1. (no state shall deny a person in its jurisdic-
leging that a state redistricting plan, on its face, has no
rational explanation save as an effort to separate voters
on the basis of race"
46
The Court affirmed the district court's determina-
tion that race was the predominating motivating factor
in drawing of the Eleventh Congressional District was
not clearly erroneous. 47 The shape and demographics of
the Eleventh District were compelling evidence of a
racial gerrymander.48 The Court explained that the shape
and demographics of the district were not the sole indi-
cators of the predominant, overriding racial motivation
of the Georgia General Assembly.
49
The Court held strict scrutiny is satisfied by a state
showing that its districting is narrowly tailored to achieve
a compelling state interest.-* The state must have con-
vincing evidence that remedial action is necessary be-
fore implementing affirmative action. sl The Court also
held that the DOJ determination that race-based
districting is required for compliance with the Act does
not command judicial deference.5
The Court held that the congressional redistricting
plan failed strict scrutiny analysis because the plan was
not required by the compelling state interest (compli-
ance with the Act), and was found to be not narrowly
tailored to match the requirements of the Act.s The
first two redistricting plans submitted by Georgia for
preclearance review were ameliorative and did not vio-
late section 5 of the Act's non-retrogression principle.'
What the DOJ demanded of Georgia was beyond the
call of the Act.55 Any compelling state interest in com-
pliance with the Act cannot withstand challenge once
it is determined that the Act does not require that the
actions actually taken were necessary for compliance.
5 6
I. LAW DEVELOPED
In sum, the Court confirmed that a Shaw claim does
not require that a district be irregular in shape, but rather
tion equal protection of the laws); Loving v.Virginia, 388 U.S.
1,11 (1967) (central mandate of Fourteenth Amendment is
race neutral government decision making); Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978)
(Powell, J.) (racial and ethnic distinctions are inherently sus-
pect and call for strict scrutiny); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (plurality opinion) (strict scrutiny
applies regardless of the race burdened or benefited); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2114 (1995) (laws
classifying citizens by race can not be upheld unless narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling state interest).
46 Miller, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 2482.
47 Id. at 2488.
48Id. at 2489 - 90.
49 d. at 2489.
s0 Id. at 2490.
s1 Id.
51 Id. at 2491.53 d. at 2491 - 92.
that shape combined with demographics can be per-
suasive circumstantial evidence of racial motivation.57
In a Shaw claim, a plaintiff has the burden of showing
that race was the predominant factor motivating a state
decision to place a significant number of voters within
or without a voting district. This can be shown by proof
that race took precedence over traditional districting
principles. 9 Traditional districting principles were listed
as compactness, contiguity, respect for political subdi-
visions, and communities defined by actual shared in-
terests.60 The Court noted that the list was not exclu-
sive.6' When traditional districting principles or other
race neutral considerations are the basis for districting
legislation, and are not subordinated to race, a state can
defeat a racial gerrymandering equal protection claim.62
A state's districting legislation cannot be saved by "mere
recitation of purported communities of interest."63
Justice Kennedy relied upon the Act's non-retro-
gression provision to stake out the bounds of his view
of the constitutional limits of the Act.61 Justice Kennedy
quoted, "'Ameliorative changes, even if they fall short
of what might be accomplished in terms of increasing
minority representation, cannot be found to violate sec-
tion 5 unless they so discriminate on the basis of race or
color as to violate the Constitution."' 6 Justice Kennedy
thus hinted that anything more than the minimum ag-
gregation of minorities into majority-minority districts
to avoid retrogression would be unconstitutional in his
eyes.
66
Justice Kennedy signaled a willingness to apply strict
scrutiny to all redistricting cases: "When the Justice
Department's interpretation of the Act compels race-
based districting, it by definition raises a serious consti-
tutional question."' Justice Kennedy provided further
hope for potential plaintiffs, 'Whether or not in some
cases compliance with the Voting Rights Act, standing
alone, can provide a compelling interest independent
of any interest in remedying past discrimination, it can-
s4 Id. at 2492.
55 Id. at 2493.56 Id. at 2490 -91.
57 Id. at 2486.
5 1 Id. at 2488.
59Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. also note, protecting incumbents. See Johnson, 864
F.Supp. 1354 at1369.
61 Miller, 115 S.Ct. 2475 at 2488.
3 Id. at 2490 (indicating that where shape and demo-
graphics have established a strong circumstantial case, post hoc
justifications will be viewed, if at all, with a jaundiced eye).
r4 See Miller, 115 S.Ct. 2475 at 2492.
65 Miller, 115 S.Ct. 2475 at 2492, citing Days, Section 5
and the Role of the Justice Department, in B. Grofman & C.
Davidson, Controversies in Minority Voting 56 (1992).
66 Miller, 115 S.Ct. 2475 at 2491-2492.
67 Id. at 2492 citing Bakke, 438 U:S. at 291 (opinion of
Powell, J.).
not do so here."ra Justice Kennedy may be merely avoid-
ing the statement of a position on an issue that had not
been presented, but he may be inviting potential plain-
tiffs to bring suits challenging a more typical district
created because of the Act's non-retrogression principle.
II. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S CONCURRENCE
Justice O'Connor voted without exception with the
majority opinion but also included a brief but impor-
tant concurrence in light of the five - four vote. Justice
O'Connor made clear that she understands "the thresh-
old standard the Court adopts- 'that the legislature
subordinated traditional race-neutral districting prin-
ciples .. to racial considerations,' to be a demanding
one To invoke strict scrutiny, a plaintiff must show that
the State has relied on race in substantial disregard of
customary and traditional districting practices."m
Justice O'Connor indicated that she intends the
reach of Shaw and Miller to be limited. She wrote, 'Ap-
plication of the Court's standard does not throw into
doubt the vast majority of the Nation's 435 congres-
sional districts, where presumably the States have drawn
the boundaries in accordance with their customary
districting principles."70 Justice O'Connor apparently is
looking for more than mere consideration of race in com-
bination with other districting factors.
7'
Justice O'Connor concluded, "[A]pplication of the
Court's standard helps achieve Shaw's basic objective
of making extreme instances of gerrymandering subject
to meaningful judicial review."72 Presumably, Justice
O'Connor will be in the position for some time to de-
cide which instances where racial considerations in
districting are extreme enough to be subject to strict
scrutiny. Justice O'Connor does not hold out much hope
for future race-based districting plaintiffs by stating that
only "extreme instances of gerrymandering" will draw
application of strict scrutiny.73
III. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S POSITION
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, Breyer,
and in part by Justice Souter, would have allowed the
Eleventh District to remain undisturbed.
6' Mi/er, 115 S.Ct. 2475 at 2490 -91.
69 Id. at 2497, internal citation to 2488 omitted.
70 Id. at 2497.
11 Id. at 2497 generally.
'2 Id. at 2497.
3 Id.
74 d. at 2500 -2502.
75 Id. at 2502 - 2504.
76 Id. at 2504 -2505.
77 Id. at 2505.
78 Id. at 2506.
Justice Ginsburg detailed the historical circum-
stances that led to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and
Georgia's subjection to it.74 From this starting point,
Justice Ginsburg highlighted the difference between the
extreme irregularity embodied in the district in Shaw v.
Reno and Georgia's Eleventh District.7s
Attacking the majority's position, Justice Ginsburg
wrote of the localized traditional ethnic districts and loy-
alties that have persisted in the political landscape of
many areas of our nation. 76 Justice Ginsburg assailed the
reasoning of the majority's opinion because it comes from
"contexts distinctly unlike apportionment."
77
Justice Ginsburg argued that districting is unique
both in character and in historical and modem justifica-
tions, and that redistricting should qualify for special
solicitude from the High Court. Districting is unique
according to Justice Ginsburg, because people are not
treated as individuals during districting, but instead are
always aggregated into groups.78
Quoting from Justice Stevens'. dissent in Adarand
Constuctors, Inc. v. Pena,79 Justice Ginsburg added to
his sentiment that there is a fundamental constitutional
difference between laws that seek to continue racial dis-
crimination and laws that seek to eradicate such prac-
tices.80 Justice Ginsburg wrote that "[sipecial circum-
stances justify vigilant judicial inspection to protect mi-
nority voters- circumstances that do not apply to ma-
jority voters."81
Justice Ginsburg concluded by rejecting the Shaw
majority's assurance that"' [tiraditional districting prin-
ciples such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for
political subdivisions.., are objective factors that may
serve to defeat a claim that a district has been gerry-
mandered on racial lines.' In view of today's decision,
that is no longer the case."82 Justice Ginsburg asserted
that now only after litigation will states know whether
districting plans that are conscious of race are secure 
3
IV. THE STANDING DILEMMA
The Court articulated what appears to be the mini-
mum standing requirements necessary to bring an equal
protection challenge to a racially gerrymandered voting
district. Residence in such a district is required."
79 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2091
(1995).80 Mi/er, 115 S.Ct. 2475 at 2506.
81 Id.
11 Id. at 2507 (Ginsburg (J.) (dissent) citing Shaw, 113
S.Ct. at 2827. Some internal punctuation omitted).
1 Id. at 2507.
81 Id. at 2485, citing United States v. Hays, 115 S.Ct. 2431,
2436 (1995) (people living outside of a district did not have
standing, and noting that harms caused by racial classifications
threaten to, stigmatize individuals, incite racial hostility and
Justice Stevens joined with Justice Ginsburg in her
dissent, and wrote separately to raise the issue of stand-
ing."' Justice Stevens did not believe that respondents in
this case have suffered any legally cognizable injury-
8 6
Justice Stevens held the position that in neither Shaw
nor Miller did the Court articulately define what injury
the cases were redressing.
6 7
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court in United
States v. Hays explained the Court's standard of stand-
ing:
It is by now well settled that the irreducible consti-
tutional minimum of standing contains three ele-
ments. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an in-
jury in fact -an invasion of a legally protected inter-
est which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b)
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypotheti-
cal. Second, there must be a causal connection be-
tween the injury and conduct complained of....
Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely specu-
lative, that the injury will be redressed by a favor-
able decision8
Justice O'Connor's explication of the Court's stand-
ing doctrine asserted that consideration of harm is the
first step in consideration of the justiciability of a claim.
If Justice Stevens is correct in his analysis then the claims
brought by both Shaw and Miller plainfiffs were not jus-
ticiable, or the Court has quietly changed the law of
standing to include amorphous "injuries." Justice Stevens
was explicit about the flaw he saw in the majority deci-
sions.'"White voters obviously lack standing to complain
of the other injury the Court has recognized under Shaw:
the stigma blacks supposedly suffer when assigned to a
district because of their race" 90
The district court's articulation of the issue is in
partial harmony with Justice Stevens', "[i]n both Shaw
and the instant case, the plaintiffs suffered no individual
harm; the 1992 congressional redistricting plans had no
adverse consequences for these white voters."9' The dis-
trict court added, "(the] harms are systemic ones, rooted
in social perception of state-sanctioned racial classifica-
tions."92
Justice Stevens continued to batter the Shaw and
Miller decisions when he wrote:
also cause representational harms, whereby a Representative
is more likely to believe their prime obligation is to represent
the members of the dominant racial group when the district
was obviously created solely to effectuate the perceived inter-
ests of one racial group); (Hays cites to Shaw at 113 S.Ct.
2816, 2825 for the explanation of representational harms, fur-
ther cites omitted).
8s Miller at 2497 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
6 Id. at 2497 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
8 Id.
" United States v. Hayes, 115 S.Ct. 2431 (1995).
9 Miller, 115 S.Ct. 2431, 2435 citing Lujan v. Defenders
Although the Shaw Court attributed representa-
tional harms solely to a message sent by the
legislature's action, those harms can only come about
if the message is received-that is, first, if all or most
black voters support the same candidate, and, sec-
ond, if the successful candidate ignores the interests
of her white constituents. Respondents' standing,
in other words, ultimately depends on the very
premise the Court purports to abhor that voters of
a particular race "'think alike, share the same politi-
cal interests, and will prefer the same candidates at
the polls."'93
The facts seem to bear out Justice Stevens' allega-
tion that the Miller plaintiffs suffered no harms. The
only plaintiff to testify at trial said, "that since he had
never attempted to contact his Member of Congress,




The Miller v. Johnson decision extended the prin-
ciple of Shaw to its logical conclusion. The decision is
appropriate based on a correct interpretation of the
Court's equal protection jurisprudence and Shaw. The
fundamental problems of standing and whether or not
Shaw was properly decided provide the dissenters and
future defenders of majority-minority districts with their
best arguments. Any future application of the Voting
Rights Act districting commands must be respectful of
"traditional districting principles."95
The Miller decision was appropriate because the law
cannot tolerate a standard as arbitrary and subjective as
the relative aesthetics of a political district. Indeed, a
district most pleasing to the eye could embody the great-
est injustices if it were to divide political subdivisions,
communities of interest, and racially discriminate. The
standard the Court appears to have settled on is over-
riding racial motivation which can be proven both cir-
cumstantially and by actual express intent.
The problem that remains with the Shaw, Hayes and
Miller line of cases is simply that the decisions do not
have strong foundations. It is difficult, if not impossible,
to put faith in "systemic," "social perception" harms to
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 - 61 (1992), (footnote, cita-
tions, and internal quotation marks omitted by Justice
O'Connor) intemal quotation marks omitted.
0 115 S.Ct. 2475, 2498 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91 Johnson, 864 F.Supp. 1354, 1370.
92 Id.
93 Miller, 115 S.Ct. 2475 at 2497 - 2498, ((internal quote
to majority at 2486), citing Shaw at 2827).
94 1995 WL 217634 ((U.S. Ga. Reply Brief), citing, T.Vol.
V, 30).
95 Miller, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 2489 (Kennedy, J., majority),
2497 (O'Connor, J., concurrence), 2507 (Ginsburg, J., dissent).
satisfy the "harm" aspect of standing when such ephem-
eral harms are evidently incapable of being proven on a
concrete or individual basis. If the harm suffered is a
"systemic" harm Hayes immediately becomes suspect.
Social perception harms would apply not only to the
district with a segregationist boundary but also to the
entire political entity that drew the boundary.
Representational harms should be required to be
proven or substantiated in some way. Phone calls and
letters that go unanswered, locations of district offices
and community meetings can all be proven. Represen-
tational harms should not be presumed in a district that
when drawn, subrogated traditional districting principles
to consideration of race, when apparently the same harm
is not presumed for a district where traditional principles
were not subrogated to race, despite the fact that each
district may contain identical statistically anomalous
percentages of racial groups when compared to the state
as a whole. The intent of a state legislature is not cred-
ibly relevant to a Congressional representative when
deciding upon whose behalf she will expend her great-
est efforts. Political realities in a representative democ-
racy cause elected representatives to serve who is intheir
district. How people in a district came to be there is
unlikely to be more than a passing interest for a repre-
sentative.
African-Americans in districts that have minority
populations that are statistically below the state wide
average may have claims for presumed representational
harms, but only if they can show that race was subrogated
to other traditional districting practices. The result is
districts that are manipulated to be underinclusive of
minorities can often be justified as incumbency protec-
tion, or based upon socio-economic "communities of
interest." Meanwhile districts that are statistically
overinclusive of minorities will often be susceptible to
being attacked as a "racial gerrymander." Where minori-
ties presently hold office they can be protected as in-
cumbents. Perhaps some majority-minority districts
could still be created where a concentration of minority
populations appear to share socio-economic communi-
ties of interest.
Justice Ginsburg and the minority's position is best
summarized in her words,'The reapportionment plan that
resulted from Georgia's political process merited this
Court's approbation, not its condemnation."96 Although
it represents a skewed reading of the facts97 it is the
minority's position to the core The minority would have
approved the districting plan as drawn, and would pre-
sumably approve more tempered applications of the Act.
Mi!/er presents a difficult paradox in that it allows a
plaintiff to point to the compelled action of a state cov-
ered by the Act as expressive of"racial intent."This para-
dox may prove the genesis for future redistricting litiga-
tion. States are called to court to defend districting plans
that were forced upon them. This curious situation bodes
well for plaintiffs facing state defendants who are likely
wishing the plaintiff every success. Georgia did not want
to draw the map that resulted in Miler. Georgia cannot
be faulted for not wanting to defend what had been
forced upon it by the DOJ.
When a state, named defendant, or intervenors can
establish a prima facie case of transferred intent from the
DOJ to the state via theVoting Rights Act, the DOJ should
be named the primary party responsible for defending the
suit. This difference might seem small, but it would allow
the DOJ to organize as effective a defense as possible for
what are, in reality, the DOJ's actions.
The caveat to minority aggregation is that the mi-
nority voting age population in the non-majority-minor-
ity districts will be artificially low. States will have dis-
tricts that are recognized and defined by racial composi-
tions. At no time would a political observer find that
race is unimportant in such a setting. This result must
be balanced against the possibility that without deliber-
ate minority aggregation into majority-minority districts
African-Americans and other minorities may be left with
as ineffective a voice as before the Act.
The practice of assuring race neutral districting is,
in our time, a sisyphean labor. Rather than undertake
what is perhaps an unattainable goal, should the United
States instead default to striving for proportional repre-
sentation for discrete subgroups of the population? This
too is a task without end, as each division will reveal
beyond it another articulate segment that cries out for
"recognition."9 8
The hope is that racial identification will one day
cease to be interlocked with political interests. When
social forces no longer force the economic, political, and
social fortunes of large pluralities of racial groups into
rather homogeneous categories, the bond between race
and political interests will be broken. The desire of any
ethnic group to be concentrated in a district with other
people of the same ethnicity will fade when individuals
in the group no longer find it politically advantageous to
be grouped with others based on common inherited
traits. The push for real equality of opportunity in edu-
cation, economics, politics, and social spheres must make
significantly greater progress before the drive for racial
group aggregation in political districts will cease.
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97 The deep involvement of the DOJ in the redistricting
plan is not normally considered part of the ordinary affairs of
any state's "political process."
98 See Johnson v. Degrandy, 114 S.Ct. 2647 (1994), (where
plaintiffs were bothAfrican-Americans and Latino-Americans);
United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh v. Carey, 430 U.S.
144 (where plaintiffs identifying characteristic was their com-
mon Jewish faith and culture). It is easy to imagine strong
cases that can be made for more groups that will Seek "recog-
nition."
